Fitting in the brazilian legal system of the Plea Bargain

Abstract

Plea Bargain is an institute from the Anglo-Saxon legal system, the Common Law, which  was proposed by the Brazilian ex-Minister of Justice and Public Security Sergio Moro to reduce the  so-called ―Brazil Cost‖. The topic is extremely current in Brazil, as it is still at the beginning of the  legislative process in the National Congress. Much will be discussed on the topic in the coming  years. There is much to be discussed on the subject, but an initial concern is whether the Plea  Bargain fits into the national legal system, does not comes across any constitutional principles or is  not so close to existing institutes that a better solution would be modernize what is already  established in Brazilian law. Thus, one wonders if the Plea Bargain, with the requirements and  procedures proposed by the ex-Minister Sergio Moro, is applicable in the Brazilian criminal justice  system. The problem has some hypotheses. A first hypothesis is that the institute fits exactly as  proposed by the Minister. A second hypothesis is the rejection of the institute for violating the  procedural law, or even the Brazilian Federal Constitution. Finally, there may be partial rejection of  the institute by the Brazilian legal system, not accepting parts of the project presented by Sergio  Moro. The purpose of this article is to verify if this institute is appropriate in the Brazilian criminal  justice system, to characterize the Plea Bargain, to demonstrate how the institute works in  countries that already adopt the Plea Bargain and to differentiate Plea Bargain from institutes  already in the homeland order, such as the criminal transaction. It is concluded that it is compatible  with Brazilian law, as it does not apply the principle of non-obviation of judiciary jurisdiction. The  methodology used in this scientific article is the hypothetical-deductive, using documentary and  bibliographic research to reach the conclusion.